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In this paper we investigate two stages in the process that leads to participation in ALMP 
programs. We use unique administrative data from the Austrian unemployment registers 
which allow us to distinguish between caseworker assignment and actual program 
enrollment. Although 25% of newly unemployed workers are assigned to a program, only half 
of them enroll and participate in the program longer than 5 days. This difference between 
assignment and enrollment rates cannot be explained by job entries, program cancelations, 
or rejected program applications alone. Therefore we analyze the influence of observable 
characteristics on each stage of the participation process. We find that beside policy 
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In the literature on empirical evaluation of social programs the problem of non-
random selection of participants has a central role. Yet, detailed information on
the participation process is rarely available and so the underlying identi¯cation
assumptions remain largely un-testable. In this paper we use unique data that
provide information on assignments as well as enrollments into programs of
active labor market policy (ALMP) in Austria. This allows us to decompose
the participation process in two separate stages: the assignment stage where the
unemployed worker receives notice of an open program slot, and the enrollment
stage which starts when the worker actually enrolls and participates in the
assigned program. We use the analytical framework developed by Heckman
and Smith (2004) to separately analyze the empirical determinants at each
stage of the participation process.
A detailed analysis of the participation process in is important for several rea-
sons. First and most general, it provides insights on inequalities in the alloca-
tion of public bene¯ts, which might not only depend on eligibility rules but also
on di®erential access and take-up across the population (Currie, 2006). Our
approach allows us not only to compare participation rates of di®erent demo-
graphic groups but also to analyze at which stage in the process the di®erences
occur.
Second, a common ¯nding in empirical evaluation studies is that program ef-
fects are heterogeneous and that ALMP programs are only bene¯cial for certain
groups. For the policy maker it is thus important to e±ciently allocate unem-
ployed workers to programs and the individual worker to the right type of
program. An approach to investigate the e±ciency of program allocations is to
compare caseworker assignments with more re¯ned statistical assignment mech-
anisms (Behncke et al., 2007; Dehejia, 2005; Lechner and Smith, 2007; Staghoj
et al., 2007). However, in these studies it is usually assumed that the o±cial
1assignment is binding, which means that policy rules can be enforced and that
the individual workers do not in°uence the participation decision. By using
more detailed data and splitting up the participation process we can examine
to what extent workers interfere in the participation process or do not comply
with the o±cial assignment.
Third, a closer examination of the participation process can also be helpful in
the choice of evaluation strategies (Heckman et al., 1999). Here, a broad dis-
tinction between empirical approaches can be made regarding the assumptions
about the observability of factors determining selection. On the one hand,
matching and propensity score methods are based on the \selection on ob-
servables\ assumption, which implies that the researcher is able to observe
all information that determines program participation and also in°uences the
outcomes (Dehejia and Whaba, 1999; Heckman and Smith, 1999). The argu-
ment usually made in favor of this assumption is that with the availability of
longitudinal administrative data the researcher observes roughly the same infor-
mation as the caseworker, and is hence able to model the caseworker's decision.
This should be the case if the participation decision depends exclusively on the
caseworker. If, on the other hand, the individual worker is able to in°uence the
participation process, \selection on observables\ is less credible. The individual
might have important private information that determines both participation
and labor market outcomes, but is not shared with either the caseworker or the
researcher. In this case we have \selection on unobservables\ and an evaluation
strategy that relies on an exogenous exclusion restrictions by, for example, mak-
ing use of particularities of the participation process may be more appropriate
(Angrist et al., 1996; Heckman, 1997).
In this paper we follow new entrants into unemployment over their unemploy-
ment spell and record all program assignments and enrollments. We ¯nd that
while almost 25% of unemployed are assigned to a program relatively early in
their unemployment spells only 12% enroll. To explain this attrition we exam-
2ine job entries, program cancelations, and rejections of program applications.
Further we investigate the empirical determinants of the probabilities to be
assigned and to be enrolled conditional on assignment. Our analysis provides
strong evidence in favor of the individual worker's in°uence over the participa-
tion process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief
overview of active labor market policy in Austria and the di®erent program
types available. Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics on
program assignments and enrollments. Section 4 discusses incentives involved
at each stage of the participation process and examines in detail the empirical
determinants at both stages. The last section concludes.
2 Active Labor Market Policy in Austria
In Austria like in many other European countries, the active component of
labor market policy has increased in importance over the last 2 decades, with
government spending on ALMP now amounting to about 0.6% of GDP (OECD,
2007). A major change in the types of policies o®ered and subsequently in par-
ticipation rates occurred during 1999/2000, when job search programs where
introduced on a relatively large scale (Hofer and Weber, 2006). These programs,
designed to improve search e±ciency, were meant to complement existing train-
ing and employment subsidy programs that are oriented toward human capital
improvements. Further, the intention of job search programs was to reach out
to unemployed workers in early stages of unemployment, to make them fa-
miliar with the ALMP programs o®ered, to develop structured training plans,
and to provide a better screening device for the more costly training programs
(Arbeitsmarktservice Ä Osterreich, 2001).
The access to active labor market programs is provided exclusively by regional
employment o±ces, while the courses are held by private contractors. In gen-
3eral, the Austrian employment o±ce (AMS) provides counseling and job place-
ment for unemployed workers, and it administers unemployment insurance ben-
e¯ts and ALMP. A worker requesting services can approach the o±ce by reg-
istering as unemployed or searching for a job, and claim bene¯t payments if
eligible. A registered worker attends regular meetings with caseworkers, where
job o®ers, job search strategies, and available ALMP options are discussed. In
order to get assigned to a program the worker can either submit an application
through the caseworker or she is directly assigned by the caseworker. During the
period following assignment the application is reviewed and the worker waits
for the start of the program. If the application is accepted and if the worker
is still unemployed at the program start they formally enroll and participate in
the program.
In this paper we use administrative data on individual assignments and en-
rollments to training, job search, and public sector employment programs that
were administered by the employment o±ce. We do not consider private sector
employment subsidies, because they follow a di®erent system. Private employ-
ment programs are wage subsidies paid to the employer for hiring an eligible
worker. Vacancies for employment subsidies get posted at the employment o±ce
and workers apply for those like for regular jobs. Therefore there is no formal
assignment procedure as in the case of the course-related program types.1
3 Data
Our data come from two sources: the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD)
and the unemployment registers of the Austrian public employment o±ce (AMS).
We use detailed information on employment, unemployment, and wages from
daily records in the ASSD, which are available for the years 1972-2004. Two
1Compared to other European countries, private sector employment subsidies play a minor
role in the Austrian ALMP system (Hofer and Weber, 2006).
4separate databases from the unemployment registers provide information on
program assignments and enrollment. The assignment data include the date
of assignment, a program number, the planned starting date of the program,
and the result from assignment (participation or non-participation plus the rea-
son why no participation occurred). The enrollment data include the program
number, as well as dates of entry into and exit from the program.
Our observation sample consists of the in°ow into unemployment between
March and August 2001. We de¯ne an individual's in°ow into unemployment
by the start of her ¯rst unemployment spell. We restrict unemployment spells
to be longer than one day. Further, we restrict individuals to be between 16 and
60 years of age and we drop individuals who were unemployed within 30 days
prior to the start of the in°ow spell. From the enrollment data we select all
programs, which start during the ¯rst year of the unemployment spell or before
the individual enters a new job. We only consider an individual as enrolled if
she participates in a program for more than 5 consecutive days. For individ-
uals who are enrolled in multiple programs we select the program that starts
¯rst. The program number gives us access to additional information about the
program like program type and the total number of participants. Our analysis
distinguishes between training, job search, and public employment programs.2
In the ASSD we can de¯ne unemployment by either bene¯t recipience or reg-
istration with the unemployment o±ce. We allow for unemployment spells
of either status, but for de¯ning the in°ow date into unemployment the spell
can only start after the individual has exited employment. To get an accurate
record of program assignments, however, we take into account that workers
anticipating unemployment may actually register with the employment o±ce
before their job has ended. We call workers who register as searching for a new
job while still employed "early searchers" and consider all program assignments
2This means we drop all individuals receiving start up grants (UGP) or Arbeitsstiftungen.
Participations in BBE (Beratungs- und Betreuungseinrichtungen) are excluded, because they
last only for one day.
5from the assignment database which take place from the ¯rst contact to the
employment o±ce preceding the in°ow into unemployment. Using these de¯ni-
tions we are able to match 99% of enrollments in the enrollment database with
a corresponding assignment from the assignment database. Cross-checking the
information on the result of program assignment in the assignment database
with the the actual enrollment gives a perfect overlap.
The full sample includes 226,621 individuals and; their descriptive characteris-
tics are shown in table 1. Information on program assignments and enrollments
are given in table 2. We see that 25% of workers are assigned to a program at
least once during their unemployment spell, while only 12% enroll in at least
one program. It is not uncommon that workers are assigned to programs mul-
tiple times. Workers who are assigned receive on average 1.7 assignments, and
workers who enroll got on average 2 assignments. Enrollment in more than one
program is not so common as we only consider the ¯rst 12 months after in°ow
into unemployment.
Table 3 provides some information about the timing of program assignment
and enrollment during the unemployment spell. It takes the average worker 151
days to ¯nd a new job, the median nonemployment duration is about 3 months.
(Note that spells are censored at 365 days.) Workers who are assigned to at
least one program are out of employment much longer than the average worker.
The median worker with assignment takes almost 10 months to ¯nd a job,
although the assignment already occurs in the second month of unemployment.
The median time from assignment to the projected program start is 3 weeks.
It is clear that workers enrolling in a program take longer to start with a new
job, because of the time they spend on the program, which is 44 days for the
median worker. The median enrolled worker gets her ¯rst assignment in the
second month of unemployment, but does not enroll in a program until about
2 months later.
6In this context is interesting to see whether assigned individuals do not enroll
in the program, because they ¯nd a job before the program starts. Only 13% of
assigned workers enter employment before the planned program start. We have
seen in table 2, however, that it is not uncommon, that workers who do not
enroll in the ¯rst program get re-assigned to a di®erent program with a later
starting date. Therefore we also consider all individuals who start a job within
2 months of the ¯rst assignment date. With this measure the rate of job entry
after assignment is 28%, but it is still lower than the enrollment rate of 50%
among assigned workers.
Table 4 gives an overview of the results from the ¯rst program assignment.
We see that only 30% of individuals participate in the ¯rst program they are
assigned to. As mentioned above, 13% take up a job before the program would
have started. The rate of individual rejections to enroll in the program is
particularly high with 30%, while rejections of program applications by the
employment o±ce are less common with 7%. Finally, the remaining 20% do
not enroll, because the their program is canceled by the unemployment o±ce,
maybe because of a too low number of participants.3
Program types of the ¯rst assignment and enrollment per individual are given
in table 5. The majority of both assignments and enrollments are to job search
programs. The second important category are training programs. Orientation
programs, a sub-category of training, which support unemployed workers to
get organized and to develop training and career plans, and public sector em-
ployment programs are less used. The enrollment rates (number of enrollments
over number of assignments) are higher to training programs with 77% than to
job search programs with 61%. We further note that for a large share (28%)
of assignments the program type is unspeci¯ed. The majority (84%) of the
unspeci¯ed programs are canceled, because they have no enrolled participants.
3We identify canceled programs by program numbers with zero enrolled participants in the
data.
7We would like to point out that the descriptive statistic based on the mean or
median workers as presented above may hide some underlying patterns. Fig-
ure 1 shows the distribution of the time from the start of the unemployment
spell to ¯rst program assignment for all workers who were assigned to a pro-
gram in the ¯rst year of unemployment. The huge spike in the graph at time
zero re°ects that 20% of assigned workers (5% of the full sample) receive an
assignment already on the ¯rst day when they register with the employment of-
¯ce. Reasons for these direct assignments seem to be incompatibilities between
the numbers of caseloads and slots for caseworker meetings. Schernhammer
and Adam (2002) discuss that in 2000 the o±cial guidelines recommended that
program participation in job search programs should be preceded by a series of
monthly meetings with the caseworker where the worker is informed about the
program and invited to participate. In several employment o±ces, however, the
density of caseloads did not permit to schedule the required number of meet-
ings. According to the report local employment o±ces sought di®erent ways
out of these incompatibilities and thus some o±ces made assignments already
on the ¯rst contact day, while others postponed the assignment to a later date.4
4 Stages in the Program Participation Process
The descriptive analysis in the last section makes clear that beside rejected ap-
plications, job entries, or program cancelations also individual rejections play
a considerable role in explaining the di®erence between assignment and enroll-
ment rates in the data. In addition, we found that repeated program assign-
ments are relatively common and many workers receive multiple assignments
before they enroll in the ¯rst program. This indicates that individual work-
ers are strongly involved in the participation process and seem to have some
leverage in negotiations with caseworkers. Therefore, our next step is to ana-
4For further details see (Weber, 2008).
8lyze the in°uence of individual characteristics at each stage of the participation
process. This will allow to distinguish between government rules regulating pro-
gram access and caseworker incentives on the one hand, and individual worker
incentives on the other hand.
Before going into details about empirical ¯ndings we start with a discussion
about the incentives of the di®erent parties involved in the decision making
at each stage of the participation process. The caseworker assigning an unem-
ployed to a program follows government eligibility regulations and policy guide-
lines as well as strategies outlined at the local employment o±ce. In addition,
he forms his own private assessment from personal contact with the client. The
worker can in°uence the assignment decision by approaching the caseworker
with the explicit wish to apply for a certain program. In such cases the ¯nal
application will still be guided by caseworker recommendations, however.
At the enrollment stage the probability to enroll conditional on assignment is
in°uenced by three main factors. First, the unemployment o±ce is involved by
accepting or rejecting the worker's application. In case of a rejection, the worker
may re-apply or be re-assigned to a di®erent course though. Second, we have
seen that some programs are canceled, presumably because of low enrollment
rates. We argue that program cancelations can be regarded as a random com-
ponent in the enrollment process, because they do not depend on the individual
worker. Third, the worker has several means to in°uence the likelihood of en-
rollment. She can manipulate the job entry by either taking a job quickly or
delaying entry into employment until after the program.5 Further, the worker
can reject program enrollment. Although most programs are compulsory and
non-compliance may result in bene¯t sanctions, the worker can ¯nd excuses or
at least negotiate a later program entry with the caseworker.
Overall, the discussion suggests that the assignment stage the decision is likely
5For an investigation of the e®ect of program assignment on job entry rates see (Weber,
2008).
9to be dominated by policy regulations and employment o±ce strategies, while
at the enrollment stage the individual worker's incentives play a more domi-
nant role. Examining the e®ects of observable factors on the assignment and
enrollment probabilities separately will reveal to what extent o±cial policies
are reinforced or counteracted by individual incentives.
To examine the e®ect of various observable characteristics on each stage of the
participation process we decompose the probability to participate Pr(par =
1jx) given a set observable characteristics x into the probability to be assigned
Pr(as = 1jx) and the probability to enroll conditional on assignment Pr(en =
1jas = 1;x) by
Pr(par = 1jx) = Pr(en = 1jas = 1;x)Pr(as = 1jx): (1)
We then estimate simple logit models for the probabilities to enter both stages.
Estimation results are presented in Table 6. The ¯rst column shows determi-
nants of program assignment, while the third column shows the determinants
of enrollment conditional on assignment. A ¯rst inspection of the results makes
clear that individual characteristics are strongly in°uencing the process at both
stages and often with o®setting e®ects.6 The coe±cient estimates on regional
dummy variables indicate considerable variation in assignment strategies as
well as supply of ALMP programs at the regional level. We also estimated
models controlling for ¯xed e®ects at the local employment o±ce level which
demonstrate this even more convincingly.7
To focus on the magnitude of the e®ects, we decompose the overall e®ect of





@Pr(en = 1jas = 1;x)
@xj
Pr(as = 1jx) (2)
6Results estimated for women and men separately are shown in tables 8 and 9.
7Results from a model with 94 local employment o±ce dummies are available on request.
10+ Pr(en = 1jas = 1;x)
@Pr(as = 1jx)
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The ¯rst column in table 7 gives the overall e®ect on participation or the term
on the right hand side of equation (2). Because of the nonlinearity of the
logit model all e®ects are evaluated for a worker with the median values of
x characteristics. In the second and ¯fth columns we present the marginal
e®ects from the logit models on the probabilities of assignment and enrollment,
respectively. In case of indicator variables the discrete change reported. The
decomposition into the two summands on the left hand side of equation (2)
are given by the product of the marginal e®ects and the probabilities that the
median x worker is assigned Pr(as = 1jx) = 0:17 or enrolled conditional on
assignment Pr(en = 1jas = 1;x) = 0:52. In columns four and seven we express
those terms as percentages of the overall e®ect. Comparing the percentage
contributions from both stages it is apparent that most variables have a stronger
in°uence at the enrollment stage.
Now let us turn to the estimation results. Everything else equal female workers
are more likely to be assigned to programs, but conditional on being assigned
females are also more likely to enroll than males. The e®ect of gender is even
stronger on the enrollment component than on assignment. We ¯nd the same
directions of e®ects for older workers and married workers. Both characteristics
lead to a slightly higher probability of assignment but to a decidedly higher
likelihood to enroll once assigned.
In the case of educational groups individual and policy incentives seem to coun-
teract. Although the least educated workers seem to be a speci¯c target group
of ALMP and thus most likely to be assigned to programs, they have lower en-
rollment rates conditional on assignment than workers holding apprenticeships
or middle- and high school graduates.
Temporary layo®s play a big role in the Austrian labor market, which is highly
11seasonal. We cannot directly control for temporary layo® status, but we use
the fact that the worker is recalled to the previous employer as a proxy. As we
can see being on recall has a strongly negative in°uence on the probability of
being assigned. This is because the caseworkers keep track of recall agreements
with employers and lower the level of counseling for temporary layo®s. But also
workers who plan to return to their previous employer have lower enrollment
rates once they get assigned. We see the same pattern for occupations in the
seasonal industries like tourism and construction, where most of the temporary
layo®s occur. A higher probability to be assigned is faced by individuals working
in manufacturing, sales, o±ce, and technical occupations. These workers are
also more likely to enroll.
Bene¯t recipients are more likely to be assigned to programs and they are also
more likely to enroll once they get assigned. This could be, because they face
pressure from bene¯t sanctions or because program applications of non-bene¯t
recipients who are not a primary policy target group are more likely to be
rejected. Workers who enter unemployment from out of the labor force are
less likely to get assigned to programs but conditional on assignment they have
higher attendance rates. This indicates that in the case of individuals who
register with AMS to become eligible for ALMP programs to some extent also
the decision to be assigned might be driven by individual incentives. Another
group of workers who might be highly motivated to participate in programs are
those who register early with AMS before their job ends. For these workers we
see particularly high enrollment rates conditional on assignment.
Past program participation could indicate that workers are on some kind of
training schedule which continues when they re-enter unemployment. We ¯nd
that program participation in the 18 months before getting unemployed is a
strong indicator for assignment and that enrollment conditional on assignment
is also higher for individuals with recent program experience.
12Labor market histories, and especially the unemployment experience in recent
years are important determinants of program participation. While the time
spent in unemployment in the past years increases the probabilities to be as-
signed and to enroll in a program, a higher number of unemployment spells
lowers the probability to be assigned but still increases the conditional enroll-
ment probability. Repeated employment spells have negative e®ects on both
probabilities, which indicates that workers who have more contacts in the labor
market are less dependent on the public services. Results on pre-unemployment
wages seem to resemble the ¯nding for educational groups: namely, although
low wage workers are more likely to be assigned, higher wages positively in°u-
ence the conditional enrollment rates.
We ¯nd di®erential patterns on assignment and enrollment probabilities by the
month of in°ow into unemployment and by region. Here it is interesting that
in regions where assignment probabilities are high, like in Vienna and most
Eastern Austrian regions, enrollment rates are considerably lower. This hints
at di®erential assignment strategies at the local employment o±ce level.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this article was to investigate two stages in the process that
leads to participation in ALMP programs using special Austrian data that allow
us to distinguish caseworker assignment from actual program enrollment. A ¯rst
inspection of the data shows that although 25% of newly unemployed workers
in 2001 are assigned to a program only half of them actually enroll. A close
examination of unemployment durations, job entries of assigned workers, and
the reasons for non-enrollment shows that the di®erence between assignment
and enrollment rates cannot be explained by job entries, program cancelations,
or rejected applications alone. This leads us to further analyze the in°uence of
individual characteristics on each stage of the participation process using the
13decomposition framework developed by Heckman and Smith (2004). As the
data provide a wide range of personal characteristics and labor market histories,
this approach allows us to distinguish between incentives at the o±cial policy
or employment o±ce level and the incentives at the individual worker level.
Our results show that observable characteristics have a strong in°uence at ei-
ther stage of the participation process. In several ways individual workers either
reinforce selection decisions taken at the o±cial level or counteract them. For
example, women, married, and older workers, as well as workers with a lot of
unemployment in the past have higher probabilities to be assigned to programs.
But conditional on assignment, they are also more likely to enroll. On the other
hand, workers with the lowest levels of education and low wages are more likely
to be assigned but less likely to enroll than workers with at least an appren-
ticeship degree or higher wages. Similarly, workers who enter unemployment
from a job face lower assignment rates but they are more likely to enroll once
assigned.
We conclude, that these results demonstrate a high degree of dependence of the
participation process on individual incentives. Individual workers have some
potential to in°uence the process at the assignment stage: for example, non-
labor market participants approaching the employment to get access to publicly
funded training programs, as well as workers registering early with the AMS
before their jobs ends. But their in°uence is even more important on the
enrollment stage where individual workers have the options to negotiate with
caseworkers, delay program entry, or simply by not to comply with policy rules.
Overall our ¯ndings imply that selection is not con¯ned to the caseworker as-
signment decision. This has important implications for the design of optimal
program assignment strategies, where it should be taken into account that ob-
served enrollment rates do not perfectly correspond to caseworker assignment
decisions. It may be the case that because of the involvement of individual work-
14ers' interests the caseworker's tasks are indeed more complicated than generally
assumed and that they are not so easily outperformed by statistical assignment
mechanisms.
Further, the evidence in favor of a strong individual component in the par-
ticipation decision casts doubts on the credibility of selection on observables
assumptions. It might be the case that neither the caseworker nor the re-
searcher are able to observe all information that jointly in°uences participation
and the outcome variables. Research designs that exploit exogenous variation
in program participation might therefore provide more reliable results. One po-
tential approach in this direction, would be to examine the considerable degree
of heterogeneity in assignment and conditional enrollment rates (in other words
program availability) at the local employment o±ce level, which we ¯nd in the
Austrian data. It indicates that program availability and ALMP strategies vary
more or less exogenously across relatively small regions, and o®ers interesting
strategies for additional research.
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18Table 1: Sample Characteristics
All Workers Female Workers
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Assigned to a program 0.252 0.434 0.271 0.444
Enrolled in a program 0.122 0.327 0.135 0.342
Female 0.487 0.500
Age 33.4 10.4 33.2 10.2
Married or Living Together 0.422 0.494 0.379 0.485
Education
Compulsory or less 0.392 0.488 0.407 0.491
Apprenticeship 0.378 0.485 0.312 0.463
Middle School 0.106 0.308 0.141 0.349
High School 0.052 0.221 0.072 0.258
Vocational High School 0.041 0.197 0.031 0.172
University Degree 0.031 0.174 0.037 0.188
Occupation
Agriculture 0.012 0.110 0.009 0.094
Manufacturing 0.254 0.435 0.129 0.335
Construction 0.075 0.264 0.002 0.048
Sales 0.154 0.361 0.172 0.377
Tourism 0.197 0.398 0.253 0.435
Service 0.069 0.253 0.109 0.312
Technical 0.033 0.179 0.012 0.110
O±ce 0.136 0.342 0.209 0.407
Health 0.070 0.256 0.104 0.306
Recalled to previous employer 0.181 0.385 0.200 0.400
Bene¯t recipient 0.843 0.364 0.826 0.379
Registers with AMS before job ends 0.116 0.320 0.128 0.334
Employed within 30 days before unemployment starts 0.720 0.449 0.715 0.452
Employed within 90 days before unemployment starts 0.770 0.421 0.752 0.432
Employed within 180 days before unemployment starts 0.806 0.396 0.780 0.414
Employed within 360 days before unemployment starts 0.865 0.342 0.830 0.375
Duration of last Job (months) 15.9 28.0 15.9 27.3
Monthly wage on last job 1,386.1 646.5 1,172.9 578.6
Program participations
within 6 months before unemployment 0.031 0.172 0.034 0.182
within 12 months before unemployment 0.055 0.229 0.059 0.235
within 18 months before unemployment 0.046 0.209 0.046 0.209
within 24 months before unemployment 0.022 0.146 0.022 0.147
within 30 months before unemployment 0.011 0.106 0.011 0.106
within 36 months before unemployment 0.005 0.067 0.005 0.067
Percentage employed
1st year before unemployment 0.622 0.362 0.601 0.375
2nd year before unemployment 0.598 0.386 0.553 0.401
3rd year before unemployment 0.575 0.400 0.521 0.412
4th year before unemployment 0.550 0.410 0.487 0.419
5th year before unemployment 0.521 0.419 0.455 0.425
Percentage unemployed
1st year before unemployment 0.158 0.220 0.156 0.219
2nd year before unemployment 0.169 0.246 0.161 0.242
3rd year before unemployment 0.162 0.250 0.154 0.248
4th year before unemployment 0.150 0.244 0.141 0.242
5th year before unemployment 0.135 0.234 0.125 0.231
Number of employment spells
1st year before unemployment 1.624 1.318 1.503 1.260
2nd year before unemployment 1.484 1.305 1.326 1.216
Continued on next page.
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All Workers Female Workers
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
3rd year before unemployment 1.352 1.236 1.196 1.167
4th year before unemployment 1.244 1.189 1.082 1.114
5th year before unemployment 1.157 1.159 0.987 1.056
Number of unemployment spells
1st year before unemployment 0.855 1.068 0.815 1.039
2nd year before unemployment 0.926 1.199 0.854 1.144
3rd year before unemployment 0.837 1.172 0.765 1.124
4th year before unemployment 0.762 1.132 0.688 1.081
5th year before unemployment 0.694 1.107 0.612 1.006
Average monthly wage
1st year before unemployment 1,197.7 710.3 970.2 629.8
2nd year before unemployment 1,130.8 736.1 890.7 650.3
3rd year before unemployment 1,062.3 753.3 827.7 659.9
4th year before unemployment 999.6 762.8 771.8 665.3
5th year before unemployment 946.3 777.2 722.4 675.9
Percentage on Maternity Leave
1st year before unemployment 0.026 0.149 0.053 0.208
2nd year before unemployment 0.040 0.182 0.082 0.254
3rd year before unemployment 0.040 0.178 0.081 0.247
4th year before unemployment 0.044 0.189 0.089 0.262
5th year before unemployment 0.045 0.194 0.093 0.269
Month of in°ow into unemployment
March 0.179 0.383 0.164 0.370
April 0.221 0.415 0.232 0.422
May 0.185 0.388 0.182 0.386
June 0.132 0.339 0.128 0.334
July 0.160 0.366 0.169 0.375
August 0.123 0.328 0.125 0.331
Region
Vienna 0.232 0.422 0.201 0.401
Lower Austria 0.146 0.353 0.144 0.351
Upper Austria 0.140 0.347 0.143 0.350
Salzburg 0.073 0.260 0.078 0.268
Tirol 0.121 0.327 0.137 0.343
Vorarlberg 0.042 0.200 0.045 0.208
Burgenland 0.028 0.166 0.028 0.166
Styria 0.138 0.345 0.141 0.348
Carinthia 0.080 0.271 0.082 0.275
Observations 226,621 110,260
Note: Sample includes all workers entering unemployment March - August 2001 with a spell of unemploy-
ment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days prior to this spell, aged 15-65. Average
wages are calculated as the average of monthly wages (in Euro, year 2000 prices) in all jobs during the
year, and set zero if no wage is reported.
20Table 2: Program Assignment and Enrollment
All Workers
Assigned at least once 25%
Enrolled at least once 12%
Mean Std.dev
Number of assignments per individual 0.43 0.92
Number of enrollments per individual 0.14 0.42
Individuals 226,621
Workers assigned at least once
Number of assignments per individual 1.70 1.09
Enrolled programs per individual 0.57 0.67
Individuals 57,020
Workers enrolled at least once
Number of assignments per individual 2.03 1.28
Number of enrollments per individual 1.18 0.45
Individuals 27,570
Notes: Sample includes all workers entering unemployment March - August 2001 with
a spell of unemployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days
prior to this spell, aged 15-65. Assignment occurs if the unemployed receives notice of a
program slot, enrollment if the worker participates for more than 5 days in s program.
All assignments and enrollments are observed during the ¯rst year of the unemployment
spell.
21Table 3: Timing of program assignment and enrollment
Mean Median Std.dev
All Workers
Time to next job (in days) 151 88 136
Individuals 226,621
Workers assigned at least once
Time to next job (in days) 245 287 127
Time until ¯rst assignment 83 47 97
Time from ¯rst assignment to planned program start 39 21 64
Fraction leaving for a job before planned program start 13%
Fraction leaving for a job within 2 months of assignment 28%
Individuals 57,020
Workers enrolled at least once
Time to next job (in days) 277 352 109
Time until ¯rst assignment 85 55 92
Time until ¯rst enrollment 138 111 100
Time from successful assignment to enrollment 26 18 25
Program duration 74 44 75
Individuals 27,570
Notes: Sample includes all workers entering unemployment March - August 2001 with a spell of unem-
ployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days prior to this spell, aged 15-65. All
durations are measured in days. Time to next job is censored at 365 days. For workers who are enrolled
at least once assignment and enrollment correspond to the ¯rst assignment or enrollment, respectively,
in the unemployment spell. If the worker receives multiple assignments before the ¯rst enrollment the
time between ¯rst assignment date and planned ¯rst program start does in general not coincide with the
time between ¯rst assignment date and ¯rst enrollment date. In this case the assignment that leads to
an enrollment is called the successful assignment. Program duration is the number of days the worker
participated in the program.
Table 4: Potential outcomes from ¯rst program assignment
Fraction of workers who after the ¯rst assignment
Enroll in the program 29.72
Move to a job before the program starts 12.75
Reject participation at the individual level 29.36
Application is rejected 7.26
Course is canceled 20.92
Total 100
Notes: Observations from 57,020 individuals who are assigned to participate in a program
at least once during their unemployment spell. Programs with zero enrolled participants
are de¯ned as canceled. Workers who do not enroll in the program or move to a job may
get re-assigned to another program later in their unemployment spell.
22Table 5: Program types of assignments and enrollments
Assignment Enrollment
Orientation 5,418 9.5% 3,300 12.0%
Training program 12,727 22.3% 9,740 35.3%
Job search program 19,621 34.4% 12,006 43.6%
Public employment program 3,172 5.6% 1,465 5.3%
Program type unspeci¯ed 16,082 28.2% 1,059 3.8%
Total 57,020 100 27,570 100
Notes: Program type refers to the ¯rst assignment or enrollment, respectively, during an
individual's unemployment spell. The program type is unspeci¯ed for 84% of assignments
to programs that have no enrolled participants and are thus de¯ned as cancelled.
23Table 6: Determinants of program participation
Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
Female 0.196 (0.013)** 0.158 (0.022)**
Age 0.018 (0.004)** 0.042 (0.006)**
Age squared 0.000 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000)**
Married or Living Together 0.073 (0.013)** 0.166 (0.021)**
Education (Compulsory or less)
Apprenticeship -0.127 (0.013)** 0.079 (0.021)**
Middle School -0.051 (0.018)* 0.067 (0.029)*
High School -0.213 (0.025)** 0.071 (0.041)
Vocational High School -0.334 (0.029)** -0.084 (0.047)
University Degree -0.367 (0.033)** -0.114 (0.055)*
Recalled to previous employer -1.209 (0.021)** -0.428 (0.041)**
Occupation (Agriculture)
Manufacturing 0.184 (0.050)** 0.017 (0.084)
Construction -0.243 (0.053)** -0.094 (0.091)
Sales 0.263 (0.050)** -0.080 (0.085)
Tourism -0.403 (0.051)** -0.267 (0.087)**
Service -0.127 (0.053)* -0.286 (0.089)**
Technical 0.554 (0.056)** 0.432 (0.093)**
O±ce 0.525 (0.051)** 0.216 (0.085)*
Health -0.064 (0.053) 0.137 (0.090)
Bene¯t recipient 0.502 (0.016)** 0.227 (0.028)**
Employed within 30 days before unemploy-
ment starts
-0.216 (0.018)** 0.066 (0.029)*
Registers with AMS before job ends 0.059 (0.017)** 0.645 (0.029)**
Program participation
within 6 months before unemployment -0.013 (0.033) 0.266 (0.049)**
within 12 months before unemployment 0.266 (0.027)** 0.249 (0.039)**
within 18 months before unemployment 0.162 (0.028)** 0.188 (0.041)**
within 24 months before unemployment 0.049 (0.038) 0.080 (0.057)
within 30 months before unemployment 0.082 (0.053) 0.056 (0.079)
within 36 months before unemployment 0.055 (0.076) 0.081 (0.113)
Percentage employed
1st year before unemployment 0.048 (0.031) -0.011 (0.050)
2nd year before unemployment -0.091 (0.028)** 0.021 (0.047)
3rd year before unemployment -0.040 (0.029) -0.054 (0.047)
4th year before unemployment 0.013 (0.030) -0.009 (0.048)
5th year before unemployment -0.013 (0.025) -0.013 (0.041)
Percentage unemployed
1st year before unemployment 0.160 (0.037)** 0.229 (0.057)**
2nd year before unemployment 0.134 (0.036)** -0.051 (0.055)
3rd year before unemployment 0.218 (0.036)** -0.059 (0.055)
4th year before unemployment 0.211 (0.036)** -0.099 (0.055)
5th year before unemployment 0.167 (0.034)** -0.053 (0.052)
Number of employment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.097 (0.007)** -0.063 (0.011)**
2nd year before unemployment -0.034 (0.007)** -0.013 (0.011)
3rd year before unemployment -0.030 (0.007)** -0.041 (0.012)**
4th year before unemployment -0.012 (0.008) -0.031 (0.013)*
5th year before unemployment -0.032 (0.008)** -0.008 (0.012)
Number of unemployment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.100 (0.009)** 0.028 (0.014)*
2nd year before unemployment -0.021 (0.008)* 0.004 (0.013)
3rd year before unemployment -0.060 (0.009)** 0.001 (0.014)
4th year before unemployment -0.025 (0.009)* 0.030 (0.014)*
Continued on next page.
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Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
5th year before unemployment -0.005 (0.009) -0.003 (0.014)
Average monthly wage
1st year before unemployment -0.036 (0.013)* 0.071 (0.021)**
2nd year before unemployment -0.045 (0.014)** -0.011 (0.023)
3rd year before unemployment 0.013 (0.015) 0.004 (0.024)
4th year before unemployment -0.006 (0.015) 0.048 (0.024)*
5th year before unemployment -0.022 (0.014) -0.040 (0.022)
Month of in°ow (August)
March 0.104 (0.019)** -0.042 (0.031)
April -0.021 (0.019) -0.119 (0.031)**
May -0.041 (0.019)* -0.109 (0.031)**
June -0.036 (0.020) -0.061 (0.032)
July -0.030 (0.019) 0.010 (0.031)
Region (Carinthia)
Vienna 1.093 (0.023)** -0.093 (0.041)*
Lower Austria 0.609 (0.024)** -0.614 (0.043)**
Upper Austria 0.083 (0.025)** 0.075 (0.046)
Salzburg -0.408 (0.034)** -0.184 (0.062)**
Tirol -0.560 (0.031)** -0.073 (0.058)
Vorarlberg 0.292 (0.034)** -0.151 (0.059)*
Burgenland 0.429 (0.036)** 0.143 (0.062)*
Styria 0.412 (0.025)** -0.089 (0.044)*
Constant -1.687 (0.085)** -1.225 (0.142)**
Observations 226,621 57,020
Note: Estimation results from logit models of assignment and enrollment conditional on assignment on
individual characteristics. The sample includes all workers entering unemployment March - August 2001
with a spell of unemployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days prior to this
spell, aged 15-65. Average wages are calculated as the average of monthly wages (in Euro, year 2000 prices)
in all jobs during the year, and set zero if no wage is reported.
25Table 7: Contributions of the Assignment and Enrollment Stage
towards Program Participation
Overall Assignment Enrollment
Marginal Marginal Std.Err. Percent Marginal Std.Err. Percent
E®ect E®ect of Overall E®ect of Overall
Female 0.026 0.030 (0.002)** 20% 0.039 (0.005)** 80%
Age 0.006 0.003 (0.001)** 8% 0.010 (0.002)** 92%
Age squared 0.000 0.000 (0.000)** 11% 0.000 (0.000)** 89%
Married or Living Together 0.023 0.011 (0.002)** 8% 0.041 (0.005)** 92%
Education (Compulsory or less)
Apprenticeship 0.007 -0.017 (0.002)** -42% 0.020 (0.005)** 142%
Middle School 0.007 -0.007 (0.003)* -17% 0.017 (0.007)* 117%
High School 0.004 -0.028 (0.003)** -115% 0.018 (0.010) 215%
Vocational High School -0.018 -0.043 (0.004)** 41% -0.021 (0.012) 59%
University Degree -0.023 -0.047 (0.004)** 35% -0.028 (0.014)* 65%
Recalled to previous employer -0.075 -0.115 (0.005)** 26% -0.106 (0.010)** 74%
Occupation (Agriculture)
Manufacturing 0.007 0.028 (0.007)** 69% 0.004 (0.021) 31%
Construction -0.018 -0.032 (0.007)** 31% -0.023 (0.023) 69%
Sales -0.003 0.041 (0.007)** -212% -0.020 (0.021) 312%
Tourism -0.043 -0.050 (0.007)** 20% -0.067 (0.022)** 80%
Service -0.040 -0.017 (0.007)* 8% -0.071 (0.022)** 92%
Technical 0.071 0.094 (0.009)** 23% 0.105 (0.023)** 77%
O±ce 0.043 0.088 (0.008)** 36% 0.053 (0.021)* 64%
Health 0.016 -0.009 (0.008) -10% 0.034 (0.022) 110%
Bene¯t recipient 0.040 0.061 (0.003)** 26% 0.057 (0.007)** 74%
Employed within 30 days
before unemployment starts 0.003 -0.033 (0.003)** -202% 0.017 (0.007)* 302%
Registers with AMS
before job ends 0.082 0.009 (0.003)** 2% 0.154 (0.007)** 98%
Program participation
within 6 months before 0.034 -0.002 (0.005) -1% 0.066 (0.012)** 101%
within 12 months before 0.039 0.042 (0.005)** 18% 0.061 (0.010)** 82%
within 18 months before 0.029 0.024 (0.004)** 15% 0.047 (0.010)** 85%
within 24 months before 0.012 0.007 (0.006) 11% 0.020 (0.014) 89%
within 30 months before 0.009 0.012 (0.008) 23% 0.014 (0.020) 77%
within 36 months before 0.012 0.008 (0.011) 12% 0.020 (0.028) 88%
Percentage employed
1st year before unemployment 0.000 0.007 (0.004) -498% -0.003 (0.013) 598%
2nd year before unemployment 0.001 -0.013 (0.004)** -444% 0.005 (0.012) 544%
3rd year before unemployment -0.008 -0.006 (0.004) 13% -0.013 (0.012) 87%
4th year before unemployment -0.001 0.002 (0.004) -39% -0.002 (0.012) 139%
5th year before unemployment -0.002 -0.002 (0.004) 17% -0.003 (0.010) 83%
Percentage unemployed
1st year before unemployment 0.034 0.023 (0.005)** 12% 0.057 (0.014)** 88%
2nd year before unemployment -0.003 0.019 (0.005)** -102% -0.013 (0.014) 202%
3rd year before unemployment -0.002 0.031 (0.005)** -237% -0.015 (0.014) 337%
4th year before unemployment -0.008 0.030 (0.005)** -69% -0.025 (0.014) 169%
5th year before unemployment -0.003 0.024 (0.005)** -148% -0.013 (0.013) 248%
Number of employment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.011 -0.014 (0.001)** 23% -0.016 (0.003)** 77%
2nd year before unemployment -0.003 -0.005 (0.001)** 33% -0.003 (0.003) 67%
3rd year before unemployment -0.006 -0.004 (0.001)** 12% -0.010 (0.003)** 88%
4th year before unemployment -0.004 -0.002 (0.001) 7% -0.008 (0.003)* 93%
5th year before unemployment -0.002 -0.005 (0.001)** 43% -0.002 (0.003) 57%
Number of unemployment spells
Continued on next page.
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Overall Assignment Enrollment
Marginal Marginal Std.Err. Percent Marginal Std.Err. Percent
E®ect E®ect of Overall E®ect of Overall
1st year before unemployment 0.001 -0.014 (0.001)** -229% 0.007 (0.004)* 329%
2nd year before unemployment 0.000 -0.003 (0.001)* 1011% 0.001 (0.003) -911%
3rd year before unemployment -0.001 -0.009 (0.001)** 111% 0.000 (0.003) -11%
4th year before unemployment 0.003 -0.004 (0.001)* -19% 0.008 (0.003)* 119%
5th year before unemployment -0.001 -0.001 (0.001) 22% -0.001 (0.003) 78%
Average monthly wage
1st year before unemployment 0.008 -0.005 (0.002)* -11% 0.018 (0.005)** 111%
2nd year before unemployment -0.003 -0.007 (0.002)** 44% -0.003 (0.006) 56%
3rd year before unemployment 0.001 0.002 (0.002) 35% 0.001 (0.006) 65%
4th year before unemployment 0.006 -0.001 (0.002) -2% 0.012 (0.006)* 102%
5th year before unemployment -0.006 -0.003 (0.002) 10% -0.010 (0.006) 90%
Month of in°ow (August)
March -0.003 0.016 (0.003)** -97% -0.010 (0.008) 197%
April -0.016 -0.003 (0.003) 3% -0.030 (0.008)** 97%
May -0.015 -0.006 (0.003)* 7% -0.027 (0.008)** 93%
June -0.009 -0.005 (0.003) 10% -0.015 (0.008) 90%
July 0.001 -0.004 (0.003) -129% 0.002 (0.008) 229%
Region (Carinthia)
Vienna 0.025 0.212 (0.006)** 150% -0.023 (0.010)* -50%
Lower Austria -0.060 0.105 (0.005)** -30% -0.150 (0.011)** 130%
Upper Austria 0.012 0.012 (0.004)** 18% 0.019 (0.011) 82%
Salzburg -0.033 -0.051 (0.005)** 27% -0.046 (0.016)** 73%
Tirol -0.021 -0.066 (0.005)** 55% -0.018 (0.015) 45%
Vorarlberg -0.012 0.046 (0.006)** -68% -0.038 (0.015)* 168%
Burgenland 0.031 0.070 (0.007)** 40% 0.035 (0.015)* 60%
Styria 0.000 0.067 (0.004)** 24958% -0.022 (0.011)* -24858%
Observations 226,621 226,621 57,020
Note: Marginal e®ects from logit models of assignment and enrollment conditional on individual charac-
teristics in columns 3 and 6. Marginal e®ects evaluated at the median worker characteristics. See text for
the calculation of the overall e®ect in column 1. Columns 5 and 8 give the percentage share of the e®ects
at the assignment and enrollment stages in the overall e®ect. The sample includes all workers entering un-
employment March - August 2001 with a spell of unemployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment
during the 30 days prior to this spell, aged 15-65. Average wages are calculated as the average of monthly
wages (in Euro, year 2000 prices) in all jobs during the year, and set zero if no wage is reported.
27Table 8: Determinants of female program participation
Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
Age 0.021 (0.006)** 0.070 (0.010)**
Age squared 0.000 (0.000)** -0.001 (0.000)**
Married or Living Together 0.071 (0.019)** 0.124 (0.030)**
Education (Compulsory or less)
Apprenticeship -0.113 (0.019)** 0.070 (0.031)*
Middle School -0.071 (0.023)** 0.043 (0.037)
High School -0.256 (0.032)** -0.001 (0.051)
Vocational High School -0.365 (0.044)** -0.077 (0.071)
University Degree -0.318 (0.044)** -0.047 (0.072)
Occupation (Agriculture)
Manufacturing 0.273 (0.080)** -0.098 (0.135)
Construction 0.226 (0.163) -0.126 (0.271)
Sales 0.362 (0.079)** -0.154 (0.134)
Tourism -0.271 (0.080)** -0.363 (0.136)*
Service -0.084 (0.081) -0.431 (0.136)**
Technical 0.686 (0.098)** 0.525 (0.160)**
O±ce 0.619 (0.079)** 0.108 (0.133)
Health 0.012 (0.081) -0.017 (0.137)
Recalled to previous employer -1.337 (0.031)** -0.494 (0.059)**
Bene¯t recipient 0.363 (0.024)** 0.180 (0.041)**
Registers with AMS before job ends 0.012 (0.023) 0.624 (0.039)**
Employed within 30 days before unemploy-
ment starts
-0.204 (0.027)** 0.082 (0.043)
Program participations
within 6 months before unemployment -0.036 (0.045) 0.207 (0.068)**
within 12 months before unemployment 0.285 (0.038)** 0.267 (0.057)**
within 18 months before unemployment 0.151 (0.040)** 0.142 (0.059)*
within 24 months before unemployment 0.071 (0.054) -0.029 (0.080)
within 30 months before unemployment 0.142 (0.075) 0.052 (0.110)
within 36 months before unemployment -0.120 (0.110) 0.094 (0.168)
Percentage employed
1st year before unemployment 0.079 (0.048) -0.108 (0.077)
2nd year before unemployment -0.007 (0.044) -0.046 (0.073)
3rd year before unemployment -0.074 (0.046) 0.017 (0.075)
4th year before unemployment 0.073 (0.047) -0.088 (0.077)
5th year before unemployment -0.051 (0.039) 0.099 (0.064)
Percentage unemployed
1st year before unemployment 0.129 (0.055)* 0.103 (0.086)
2nd year before unemployment 0.203 (0.054)** -0.146 (0.085)
3rd year before unemployment 0.174 (0.055)** -0.093 (0.085)
4th year before unemployment 0.258 (0.056)** -0.230 (0.086)*
5th year before unemployment 0.147 (0.052)* -0.044 (0.080)
Percentage on maternity leave
1st year before unemployment 0.073 (0.061) -0.111 (0.094)
2nd year before unemployment 0.269 (0.067)** -0.151 (0.105)
3rd year before unemployment -0.009 (0.061) -0.001 (0.096)
4th year before unemployment 0.129 (0.061)* -0.112 (0.096)
5th year before unemployment 0.025 (0.048) -0.088 (0.076)
Number of employment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.093 (0.011)** -0.077 (0.017)**
2nd year before unemployment -0.022 (0.011)* -0.014 (0.017)
3rd year before unemployment -0.042 (0.012)** -0.080 (0.020)**
4th year before unemployment 0.013 (0.012) -0.011 (0.019)
5th year before unemployment -0.047 (0.013)** -0.039 (0.020)
Number of unemployment spells
Continued on next page.
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Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
1st year before unemployment -0.152 (0.014)** 0.037 (0.021)
2nd year before unemployment -0.052 (0.012)** 0.012 (0.020)
3rd year before unemployment -0.057 (0.013)** 0.060 (0.021)*
4th year before unemployment -0.039 (0.013)* 0.031 (0.021)
5th year before unemployment -0.025 (0.014) 0.020 (0.023)
Average monthly wage
1st year before unemployment -0.037 (0.020) 0.099 (0.033)**
2nd year before unemployment -0.031 (0.022) -0.025 (0.036)
3rd year before unemployment 0.021 (0.023) 0.048 (0.037)
4th year before unemployment -0.039 (0.024) -0.004 (0.037)
5th year before unemployment -0.023 (0.022) -0.072 (0.035)*
Month of in°ow (August)
March 0.187 (0.027)** -0.028 (0.043)
April 0.035 (0.026) -0.136 (0.042)**
May 0.011 (0.027) -0.131 (0.043)**
June 0.006 (0.028) -0.086 (0.044)
July -0.001 (0.026) -0.047 (0.042)
Region (Carinthia)
Vienna 0.833 (0.032)** -0.185 (0.053)**
Lower Austria 0.377 (0.033)** -0.668 (0.057)**
Upper Austria -0.079 (0.034)* 0.000 (0.059)
Salzburg -0.469 (0.044)** -0.260 (0.080)**
Tirol -0.617 (0.041)** -0.228 (0.075)**
Vorarlberg 0.360 (0.044)** -0.256 (0.074)**
Burgenland 0.252 (0.049)** 0.031 (0.082)
Styria 0.364 (0.033)** -0.155 (0.057)*
Constant -1.482 (0.128)** -1.050 (0.214)**
Observations 110,260 29,834
Note: Estimation results from logit models of assignment and enrollment conditional on assignment on
individual characteristics. The sample includes all female workers entering unemployment March - August
2001 with a spell of unemployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days prior to
this spell, aged 15-65. Average wages are calculated as the average of monthly wages (in Euro, year 2000
prices) in all jobs during the year, and set zero if no wage is reported.
29Table 9: Determinants of male program participation
Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
Age 0.001 (0.005) 0.042 (0.009)**
Age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Married or Living Together 0.142 (0.018)** 0.166 (0.030)**
Education (Compulsory or less)
Apprenticeship -0.160 (0.018)** 0.079 (0.030)*
Middle School 0.002 (0.029) 0.067 (0.048)*
High School -0.098 (0.043)* 0.071 (0.069)*
Vocational High School -0.298 (0.039)** -0.084 (0.064)
University Degree -0.419 (0.052)** -0.114 (0.086)**
Occupation (Agriculture)
Manufacturing 0.138 (0.064)* 0.017 (0.109)
Construction -0.324 (0.066)** -0.094 (0.113)
Sales 0.200 (0.066)** -0.080 (0.112)
Tourism -0.492 (0.068)** -0.267 (0.118)
Service 0.052 (0.075) -0.286 (0.127)
Technical 0.521 (0.071)** 0.432 (0.118)**
O±ce 0.486 (0.068)** 0.216 (0.115)*
Health -0.039 (0.075) 0.137 (0.129)*
Recalled to previous employer -1.072 (0.030)** -0.428 (0.058)**
Bene¯t recipient 0.574 (0.025)** 0.227 (0.044)**
Registers with AMS before job ends 0.110 (0.025)** 0.645 (0.043)**
Employed within 30 days before unemploy-
ment starts
-0.253 (0.024)** 0.066 (0.039)
Program participations
within 6 months before unemployment 0.059 (0.048) 0.266 (0.071)**
within 12 months before unemployment 0.270 (0.038)** 0.249 (0.055)**
within 18 months before unemployment 0.173 (0.038)** 0.188 (0.057)**
within 24 months before unemployment 0.073 (0.055) 0.080 (0.081)*
within 30 months before unemployment 0.035 (0.076) 0.056 (0.113)
within 36 months before unemployment 0.217 (0.106)* 0.081 (0.154)
Percentage employed
1st year before unemployment 0.149 (0.044)** -0.011 (0.073)
2nd year before unemployment 0.041 (0.042) 0.021 (0.070)
3rd year before unemployment -0.033 (0.043) -0.054 (0.073)
4th year before unemployment 0.002 (0.044) -0.009 (0.073)
5th year before unemployment 0.003 (0.037) -0.013 (0.062)
Percentage unemployed
1st year before unemployment 0.292 (0.053)** 0.229 (0.082)**
2nd year before unemployment 0.257 (0.052)** -0.051 (0.082)
3rd year before unemployment 0.227 (0.054)** -0.059 (0.085)
4th year before unemployment 0.210 (0.055)** -0.099 (0.086)
5th year before unemployment 0.181 (0.051)** -0.053 (0.078)
Number of employment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.096 (0.009)** -0.063 (0.015)**
2nd year before unemployment -0.044 (0.009)** -0.013 (0.014)
3rd year before unemployment -0.022 (0.009)* -0.041 (0.015)
4th year before unemployment -0.029 (0.010)* -0.031 (0.017)*
5th year before unemployment -0.025 (0.010)* -0.008 (0.016)
Number of unemployment spells
1st year before unemployment -0.058 (0.012)** 0.028 (0.019)
2nd year before unemployment 0.011 (0.011) 0.004 (0.017)
3rd year before unemployment -0.062 (0.012)** 0.001 (0.018)*
4th year before unemployment -0.017 (0.012) 0.030 (0.019)
5th year before unemployment 0.005 (0.012) -0.003 (0.018)
Average monthly wage
Continued on next page.
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Assignment Enrollment
Coe±cient Std.Err. Coe±cient Std.Err.
1st year before unemployment -0.008 (0.017) 0.071 (0.027)
2nd year before unemployment -0.038 (0.019)* -0.011 (0.030)
3rd year before unemployment -0.008 (0.020) 0.004 (0.032)
4th year before unemployment 0.012 (0.020) 0.048 (0.033)*
5th year before unemployment -0.032 (0.019) -0.040 (0.030)
Month of in°ow (August)
March 0.015 (0.027) -0.042 (0.045)
April -0.083 (0.027)** -0.119 (0.045)*
May -0.086 (0.027)** -0.109 (0.045)
June -0.076 (0.028)* -0.061 (0.047)
July -0.055 (0.027)* 0.010 (0.045)
Region (Carinthia)
Vienna 1.368 (0.035)** -0.093 (0.064)
Lower Austria 0.869 (0.037)** -0.614 (0.069)**
Upper Austria 0.269 (0.039)** 0.075 (0.073)*
Salzburg -0.341 (0.053)** -0.184 (0.100)
Tirol -0.493 (0.049)** -0.073 (0.094)
Vorarlberg 0.199 (0.054)** -0.151 (0.099)
Burgenland 0.636 (0.054)** 0.143 (0.096)**
Styria 0.471 (0.039)** -0.089 (0.071)
Constant -1.867 (0.118)** -1.225 (0.200)**
Observations 116,361 27,186
Note: Estimation results from logit models of assignment and enrollment conditional on assignment on
individual characteristics. The sample includes all male workers entering unemployment March - August
2001 with a spell of unemployment longer than 1 day and no unemployment during the 30 days prior to
this spell, aged 15-65. Average wages are calculated as the average of monthly wages (in Euro, year 2000
prices) in all jobs during the year, and set zero if no wage is reported.
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